Optimal Policy Under Model Uncertainty by Kriwoluzky, Alexander & Stoltenberg, Christian
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2007-040 
Optimal Policy Under 
Model Uncertainty: 
A Structural-Bayesian 
Estimation Approach 
 
Alexander Kriwoluzky* 
Christian Stoltenberg* 
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
ISSN 1860-5664 
 
SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
S
FB
  
  
  
6
 4
 9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
E
 C
 O
 N
 O
 M
 I 
C
  
  
 R
 I 
S
 K
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 E
 R
 L
 I 
N
 
OPTIMAL POLICY UNDER MODEL UNCERTAINTY:
A STRUCTURAL-BAYESIAN ESTIMATION APPROACH∗
Alexander Kriwoluzky,†Christian Stoltenberg‡
July 9, 2007
Abstract
In this paper we propose a novel methodology to analyze optimal policies under
model uncertainty in micro-founded macroeconomic models. As an application we
assess the relevant sources of uncertainty for the optimal conduct of monetary policy
within (parameter uncertainty) and across models (specification uncertainty) using
EU 13 data. Parameter uncertainty matters only if the zero bound on interest rates
is explicitly taken into account. In any case, optimal monetary policy is highly sensi-
tive with respect to specification uncertainty implying substantial welfare gains of a
robustly-optimal rule that incorporates this risk.
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I have myself said several times that the Governing Council of the ECB has no intention of being
the “prisoner” of a single system of equations. We both (Greenspan and Trichet) highly praise “ro-
bustness”. There is no substitute for a comprehensive analysis of the risks to price stability that pays
due attention to all relevant information.
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, 2005
Introduction
How should optimal policy be conducted if the policy maker is uncertain about the economic
environment? Following Brainard (1967), numerous researchers consider theoretically the per-
formance of (monetary) policy under parameter uncertainty and across various macroeconomic
models.1 Not surprisingly, the policy recommendations are sensitive with respect to assumptions
about the relevant model uncertainty. For example, optimal monetary policy can be either cau-
tious or more aggressive compared to the case where the true model is known. On the other hand
the empirical evaluation of micro-founded DSGE models employing Bayesian methods has made
substantial progress (Smets and Wouters, 2003 and An and Schorfheide, 2006). Combining these
lines of research we propose a novel methodology to analyze the optimal conduct of policy under
various sources of model uncertainty for a wide range of micro-founded macroeconomic models.
In our framework we capture the optimal conduct of policy if the policy maker faces uncer-
tainty about the true parameters of a model (parameter uncertainty), if the true model is not known
(specification uncertainty) or a combination of both. We can analyze specification uncertainty in
various ways: Omitted variables, additional lags in endogenous variables or shock processes and
autocorrelation of error terms. We do not take a stand on the true data generating process.2 On the
contrary, we assume that after some process of theorizing and data analysis the policy maker has
arrived at a set of competing models. Our approach involves two steps. First, we estimate these
models by Bayesian model estimation techniques to explain a set of macroeconomic time series.
Then, the relevant source of parameter uncertainty is described by the joint posterior distribution
1For example McCallum (1998), Soderstrom (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2003)
or more recently Küster and Wieland (2005).
2See e.g. Sargent (1999) for an analysis of that case for the US economy.
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of the structural parameters and specification uncertainty is assessed by the marginal density of
each model. Second, we determine the optimal policy under model uncertainty by maximizing
the unconditional expectation of representative household’s utility for each model. Notably, due
to our strictly micro-founded approach this welfare measure and not only the structural equations
are affected by moving along the parameter and/or the model space. The policy rule that performs
best with respect to both sources of uncertainty is called the robustly-optimal rule.
We apply our method to determine optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty. Our
benchmark model is a standard cashless New Keynesian economy with staggered price setting
without indexation (Woodford, 2003). As examples for specification uncertainty we subsequently
allow for more lags in endogenous variables (indexation and habit formation), for omitted variables
(money) and for one large model that nests all features. While the cashless models are character-
ized by price stability as predominant principle, a demand for cash introduces the stabilization
of the nominal interest rate as a conflicting aim. Estimating theses models using EU 13 data this
bottom-up approach allows us to evaluate quantitatively the gain in explanatory power of each ex-
tension separately. I.e. ex post we can judge how reasonable the original choice of model features
was. This approach marks a difference to the related literature that starts with a certain model (see
Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams, 2005 or Smets and Wouters, 2003) and then proceeds by
including some extensions without quantifying their importance.
We differ from the existing literature in one further important aspect. Throughout our analysis
we consider two cases: either policy faces an additional constraint that requires interest policy to
be consistent with the zero bound (implementability) or not. We approximate the lower bound
constraint in the following way. Choosing price stability as approximation point, we require the
difference between the real interest rate and the zero bound to represent at least 2 standard devia-
tions.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• We find that the model that incorporates all features is not the best model to explain the
data. Thus, setting up a large model cannot be recommended from a Bayesian-econometric
perspective.
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• If optimal policies are subject to the implementability constraint, then this induces sizeable
welfare losses compared to the unconstrained case in models that are characterized by price
stability as the predominant stabilization principle. Meeting this requirement is shown to
be very sensitive with respect to uncertainty about the true parameters of each model.
• If policy is not constrained by implementability, optimal policies under parameter uncer-
tainty and certainty are remarkably similar. In particular, the welfare losses that result from
pursuing the latter instead of the former are neglectable.
• In any case, uncertainty about the true structure leads to high welfare losses over the model
space. Pursuing the optimal policy from the model that incorporates all features cannot be
recommended as a policy device. On the contrary, the optimal policy rule that is robust to
specification uncertainty performs significantly better across models than any optimal rule
of a particular model.
• We compute and recommend an optimal policy that is aware of both sources of uncertainty.
Though different from a minmax strategy, it evades both high losses and violations of the
zero bound over the model and parameter space.
Related Literature Our paper is related to Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (LOWW, 2005).
They estimate a medium-scale New Keynesian Model with staggered price setting using US data
and determine the optimal monetary policy in that model across the posterior distribution of the
estimated parameters. Their optimal simple interest rate feedback rule is shown to be robust with
respect to parameter uncertainty in structural parameters including the coefficients of the shock
processes. However, as a side aspect, they find the optimal rule not to be robust to different exten-
sions of the model including a demand for cash and different price and wage setting algorithms.
The main differences to our approach are first that our estimation strategy allows us to quantify
the importance of each model component for explaining the data and for the optimal conduct of
monetary policy separately. As our main novel feature we analyze optimal policy across models
using the posterior odds of all models under consideration. I.e. we give policy recommendations
4
in the presence of specification uncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the welfare effects of the zero
bound restriction on interest rates under model uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our general
framework to analyze the optimal conduct of policy in a broad range of micro-founded macroe-
conomic models. In the following sections we apply our methodology to optimal monetary policy
under model uncertainty. The last section concludes.
1 Analyzing optimal policy under model uncertainty
In this section we describe the general framework and our novel methodology to analyze the opti-
mal conduct of policy if the decision maker faces model uncertainty in micro-founded macroeco-
nomic models. We assume that after some process of theorizing and data analysis the policy maker
has arrived at a set of competing models. We propose to estimate these models by Bayesian model
estimation techniques to explain a set of macroeconomic time series. Then the relevant source
of parameter uncertainty is described by the joint posterior distribution of the structural parame-
ters. The relevant degree of specification uncertainty enters our analysis by the marginal density of
each model. After setting up the general framework, we show how to derive optimal simple feed-
back rules that are robust with respect to parameter uncertainty, specification uncertainty and a
combination of both.
1.1 General framework
Consider a system of linear equations that represent log-linear approximations to the non-linear
equilibrium conditions under rational expectations around a deterministic steady state of a par-
ticular model i . Let xt be the vector of state variables, zt the vector of structural shocks and yt the
vector of observable variables. Furthermore, based on Bayesian model estimation techniques, let
Θ denote the random vector of deep parameters and θ a particular realization from the joint pos-
terior distribution.3 Policy influences the equilibrium outcome by simple feedback rules. The link
3An and Schorfheide (2006) give an overview about Bayesian estimation procedures in DSGE models.
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between the set of policy instruments as a subset of x is characterized by the vector of constant
policy coefficients φ. I.e. per definition we consider steady state invariant policies. The state space
form of the fundamental solution of model i is given by4:
x̂t = T (θi ,φ)x̂t−1+R(θi ,φ)zt (1)
ŷt =Gx̂t , (2)
where T (θi ,φ) and R(θi ,φ) are matrices one obtains after solving a DSGE model with standard so-
lution techniques. However, the entries of the matrixes T and R may differ across models since Θ
varies. The benchmark model is the model that restricts some entries of Θ and correspondingly
T to zero. Perturbations of the benchmark model are defined as dissolving zero restrictions. Sup-
pose one perturbation of a benchmark model is characterized by converting the forward-looking
variable consumption from the benchmark model into a history dependent variable by assuming
habit persistence. Then, the column of T that is associated with lagged consumption has zeros in
the benchmark model but at least one non-zero entry in the perturbation. In addition, the vec-
tor Θ exhibits a non-zero value for the habit parameter in the perturbation but a zero value in the
benchmark model. This formulation implies that all perturbations and the benchmark are nested
in the largest model. The matrix G is a picking matrix that equates observable and state variables.
Using this equation and the solution given by (1) we estimate model i using data Y with Bayesian
model estimation techniques.
Given a certain realization of Θi , we assess the performance of a particular policy φ with two
different criteria: A welfare and an implementability measure. As welfare measure we are using a
particular quadratic loss function L(θi , x̂) which represents the unconditional expectation of the
steady state invariant part that belongs to a valid second order approximation to representative
4x̂t denotes the percentage deviation of the generic variable xt from a deterministic steady state x¯ chosen
as approximation point.
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households’ utility in model i .5
E
∞∑
t=t0
βtU (xt ,θi )≈ U (x¯,θi )
1−β −E
∞∑
t=t0
βt A(θi )x̂t x̂
′
t =
U (x¯,θi )−L(θi , x̂)
1−β (3)
We assume that the policy maker can credibly commit to a policy rule φ. Thus, the standard
task of optimal policy is to find a particular steady state invariant policy φ?i , such that the implied
solution for x̂t minimizes the loss of the representative agent subject to (1). In any case, we only
consider fundamental solutions and require the set of equilibrium sequences to be locally stable
and unique. We now turn to the problem how to determine optimal policy under parameter and
specification uncertainty.
1.2 Optimal policy under parameter uncertainty
We treat the mean vector E [Θi ] of the joint posterior distribution as the true value for the deep
parameters of model i . Thus, we think of the joint posterior distribution in model i , f (θi ), as the
relevant uncertainty that a policy maker faces when he makes his decision about φ. The optimal
policy problem under parameter uncertainty given the posterior distribution for Θ in model i can
be stated as follows:
min
φ
EΘi L(Θi , x̂)=min
φ
∫
θi
L(θi , x̂) f (θi )dθi (4)
s.t . x̂t = T (θi ,φ)x̂t−1+R(θi ,φ)zt , ∀θi .
Under parameter uncertainty the policy maker has to average the loss over all possible realization
of Θ with positive probability to find the optimal vector of constant policy coefficients in model i ,
φ?i pu .
6
5Benigno and Woodford show that a purely quadratic micro-founded loss function can be derived for a
wide range of models (2006b). Applications of their method include monetary economics (2005) and the
classical Ramsey optimal taxation problem (2006a).
6Note that we do not consider the perspective of a policy maker that uses Bayesian learning to update his
beliefs about a model’s parameters or the model itself (see e.g. Cogley and Sargent (2005)).
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If φ?i pu differs from φ
?
i and pursuing the latter rather than the former leads to high average
welfare losses across the parameter space, then parameter uncertainty matters for the optimal con-
duct of policy even if the true model is known.
1.3 Specification uncertainty
While under parameter uncertainty the policy maker believes that the given model is the true
model, under specification uncertainty he has to deal with a situation where the parameter vec-
tor is known to him but the true model is not. We consider and estimate a discrete set of models
M = {M1, ...,Mn}, where each is characterized by the number and position of zero restrictions in
the vectors for deep parameters and variables. By subsequently adding zero restrictions to the
largest model Mn , one finally arrives at the benchmark model M1. Since we estimate all mod-
els separately using the same data and the same number of shocks we can reasonably calculate
marginal data densities p(Y |Mi ) and posterior odds to assess the probability that model i is the
true model. The latter are defined as:
pii = pi0i p(Y |Mi )∑n
j=1pi0 j p(Y |M j )
, (5)
wherepi0i denotes the prior probability for each model. Note that this formulation is not restrictive.
It captures the possibility of different assumptions about the policy maker’s own beliefs – unless he
assigns equal prior weights for all models: Avoiding the worst outcome in a particular model i
(without ignoring the information how likely or unlikely this is) corresponds to setting a high prior
probability for that model. 7
Suppose that the policy maker knows the exact values for all parameters, E [Θi ], but is uncertain
7We employ Geweke’s(1999) harmonic mean estimator to compute the data likelihood in a certain model
that takes into account both, how well the model fits the data and how many parameters are used to achieve
this.
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about the true model. Then the optimal policy problem can be formulated in the following way:
min
φ
EML(E [Θi ], x̂)=pi1L(E [Θ1], x̂)+ ...+pinL(E [Θn], x̂) (6)
s.t . x̂t = T (E [Θi ],φ)x̂t−1+R(E [Θi ],φ)zt , i = 1, ...,n,
where
∑n
i=1pii = 1. The gains of this optimal policy rule φ?su can be large if the optimal policy
prescriptions in the set of models φ?1 , ...,φ
?
n differ substantially due to the presence of different and
possibly conflicting stabilization aims. Therefore the inclusion of a micro-founded loss function
in each model instead of using a single arbitrary quadratic function plays an important role to
account adequately for these differences across models.
1.4 Parameter and specification uncertainty
The more realistic case is that the decision maker does not know exactly neither the true model
nor the exact values of all deep parameters. Uncertainty is then composed of parameter and spec-
ification uncertainty jointly. Then the optimal policy problem to determine the overall robustly-
optimal policy rule can be stated as follows:
min
φ
EMEΘL(Θi , x̂)=pi1EΘ1 L(Θ1, x̂t )+ ...+pinEΘn L(Θn , x̂t ) (7)
s.t . x̂t = T (θi ,φ)x̂t−1+R(θi ,φ)zt , ∀θi , i = 1, ...,n.
Comparing this optimal device for policy φ?psu with the results of (6) allows us to examine the
role of specification and parameter uncertainty jointly: should policy makers pay special attention
to the interaction of these sources of uncertainty?
Throughout the paper we express the resulting business cycle costs as the percentage loss in
certainty (steady state) equivalent consumption. First we compute the loss of a certain policy φ˜
given a particular parameter vector θ˜ in model i to derive overall utility:
U (c(θ˜i ), x\c (θ˜i ), θ˜i )−L(θ˜i , φ˜),
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where the first term is steady state utility and x\c denotes the variables vector excluding consump-
tion. Since we want to express utility as reduction in certainty consumption equivalents we set this
expression equal to:
Ui (c(θ˜i )∗ (1−%), x\c (θ˜i ), θ˜i )
and solve for % in percentage terms. Under parameter uncertainty this results in a distribution
for %(θ˜i , φ˜) over Θi . Taking the expectation of this expression yields a measure for average losses
in certainty consumption equivalents under a particular policy φ˜. In the absence of parameter
uncertainty we set θ˜i = E [Θi ].
To apply our methodology we now analyze the optimal conduct of monetary policy under
model uncertainty.
2 Monetary policy: the economic environment
In this section we describe briefly the benchmark economy, a plain-vanilla cashless new keyne-
sian economy (Woodford, 2003) and some reasonable deviations from this simple environment.
Concretely, we allow for two different types of specification uncertainty: the case of omitted state
variables or missing lags, habit formation and indexation, and the situation where one variable is
not considered at all. To analyze that case we introduce a transaction friction that induces a de-
mand for cash. In the last subsection we describe how we encounter the issue of the zero bound
requirement for interest rates.
2.1 The benchmark economy
The benchmark economy consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households indexed with j ∈
[0,1]. It is assumed that households have identical initial asset endowments and identical prefer-
ences. Household j acts as a monopolistic supplier of labor services l j . Lower (upper) case letters
denote real (nominal) variables. At the beginning of period t , households’ financial wealth com-
prises a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment Z j t ,
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and one period nominally non-state contingent government bonds B j t−1 carried over from the
previous period. Assuming complete financial markets let qt ,t+1 denote the period t price of one
unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 normalized by the probability of occurrence
of that state, conditional on the information available in period t . Then, the price of a random
payoff Zt+1 in period t +1 is given by Et [qt ,t+1Z j t+1]. The budget constraint of the representative
household reads
B j t +Et [qt ,t+1Z j t+1]+Pt c j t ≤Rt−1B j t−1+Z j t +Pt w j t l j t +
∫ 1
0
D j i t di −Pt Tt , (8)
where ct denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption with elasticity of substitution ζ, Pt the
aggregate price level, w j t the real wage rate for labor services l j t of type j , Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the
gross nominal interest rate on government bonds, and Di t dividends of monopolistically competi-
tive firms. Further, households have to fulfill the no-Ponzi game condition, limi→∞Et qt ,t+i (B j t+i+
Z j t+1+i )≥ 0. The objective of the representative household is
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt {u(c j t )− v(l j t )}, β ∈ (0,1), (9)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to
be non-decreasing in consumption, decreasing in labor time, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable, and to fulfill the Inada conditions.
Households are wage-setters supplying differentiated types of labor l j which are transformed
into aggregate labor lt with l
(²t−1)/²t
t =
∫ 1
0 l
(²t−1)/²t
j t d j . We assume that the elasticity of substitution
between different types of labor, ²t > 1, varies exogenously over time. The time variation in this
markup parameter introduces a so called cost-push shock into the model that gives rise to a sta-
bilization problem for the central bank. Cost minimization implies that the demand for differenti-
ated labor services l j t , is given by l j t = (w j t /wt )−²t lt , where the aggregate real wage rate wt is given
by w 1−²tt =
∫ 1
0 w
1−²t
j t d j . Maximizing (9) subject to (8) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given
initial values Z0, Bt0−1, and Rt0−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order conditions for consumption,
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the real wage rate for labor type j , government bonds, and contingent claims:
λ j t =uc (c j t ), vl (l j t )=w j tλ j t /φt , (10)
qt ,t+1 =
βλ j t+1
pit+1λ j t
, λ j t =βRt Et
λ j t+1
pit+1
(11)
where λ j t denotes a Lagrange multiplier, pit the inflation rate pit = Pt /Pt−1, and µt = ²t /(²t −1) the
stochastic wage mark-up with mean µ¯> 1. The first order condition for contingent claims holds for
each state in period t +1, and determines the price of one unit of currency for a particular state at
time t+1 normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence of that state in units of currency
in period t . Arbitrage-freeness between government bonds and contingent claims requires Rt =
1/Et qt ,t+1. The optimum is further characterized by the budget constraint (8) holding with equality
and by the transversality condition limi→∞Etβiλ j t+i (B j t+i +Z j t+1+i )/P j t+i = 0.
The final consumption good Yt is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced by monopo-
listically competitive firms indexed with i ∈ [0,1] and defined as y
ζ−1
ζ
t =
∫ 1
0 y
ζ−1
ζ
i t di , with ζ> 1. Let Pi t
and Pt denote the price of good i set by firm i and the price index for the final good. The demand
for each differentiated good is ydi t = (Pi t /Pt )−ζ yt , with P
1−ζ
t =
∫ 1
0 P
1−ζ
i t di . A firm i produces good yi
using a technology that is linear in the labor bundle li t = [
∫ 1
0 l
(²t−1)/²t
j i t d j ]
²t /(²t−1): yi t = at li t , where
lt =
∫ 1
0 li t di and at is a productivity shock with mean 1.
Labor demand satisfies: mci t =wt /at , where mci t =mct denotes real marginal costs indepen-
dent of the quantity that is produced by the firm.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of a staggered price setting as developed by Calvo
(1983). Each period firms may reset their prices with the probability 1−α independently of the
time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction α ∈ [0,1) of firms are assumed to keep
their previous period’s prices, Pi t = Pi t−1, i.e. indexation is absent. Firms are assumed to maxi-
mize their market value, which equals the expected sum of discounted dividends Et
∑∞
T=t qt ,T Di T ,
where Di t ≡ Pi t yi t (1−τ)−Pt mct yi t and we used that firms also have access to contingent claims.
Here, τ denotes an exogenous sales tax introduced to offset the inefficiency of steady state out-
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put due to markup pricing (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). In each period a measure 1−α of
randomly selected firms set new prices P˜i t as the solution to maxP˜i t Et
∑∞
T=t α
T−t qt ,T (P˜i t yi T (1−
τ)−PT mcT yi T ), s.t. yi T = (P˜i t )−ζPζT yT . The first order condition for the price of re-optimizing
producers is for α> 0 given by
P˜i t
Pt
= ζ
ζ−1
Ft
Kt
, (12)
where Kt and Ft are given by the following expressions:
Ft = Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t uc (cT )yT
(
PT
Pt
)ζ
mcT (13)
and
Kt = Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t uc (cT )(1−τ)yT
(
PT
Pt
)ζ−1
. (14)
Aggregate output is given by yt = at lt /∆t , where ∆t =
∫ 1
0 (Pi t /Pt )
−ζdi ≥ 1 and thus ∆t = (1−
α)(P˜t /Pt )−ζ+αpiζt∆t−1. The dispersion measure ∆t captures the welfare decreasing effects of stag-
gered price setting. If prices are flexible, α= 0, then the first order condition for the optimal price
of the differentiated good reads: mct = (1−τ) ζ−1ζ .
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. The central bank as the mon-
etary authority is assumed to control the short-term interest rate Rt with a simple feedback rule
contingent on past interest rates, inflation and output:
Rt = f (Rt−1,pit , yt ). (15)
The fiscal authority issues risk-free one period bonds, has to finance exogenous government ex-
penditures PtGt , receives lump-sum taxes from households and tax-income from an exogenous
given constant sales tax τ, such that the consolidated budget constraint reads: Rt−1Bt−1+PtGt =
Bt +Pt Tt +
∫ 1
0 Pi t yi tτdi . The exogenous government expenditures Gt evolve around a mean G¯ ,
which is restricted to be a constant fraction of output, G¯ = y¯(1− sc). We assume that tax policy
guarantees government solvency, i.e., ensures limi→∞ (Bt+i )
∏i
v=1 R
−1
t+v = 0. Due to the existence
of the lump-sum tax, we consider only the demand effect of government expenditures and focus
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exclusively on optimal monetary policy.
We collect the exogenous disturbances in the vector ut = [at ,Gt ,µt ]. It is assumed that the
percentage deviations of the first two elements of the vector from their means evolve according
to autonomous AR(1)-processes with autocorrelation coefficients ρa ,ρG ∈ [0,1). The process for
log(µt /µ¯) as well as all innovations, zt = [²at ,²gt ,²µt ], are assumed to be i.i.d..
The recursive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given initial values Pt0−1 > 0 and ∆t0−1 ≥ 1, a monetary policy and a ricardian fis-
cal policy Tt ∀ t ≥ t0, a sales tax τ, a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for Rt ≥ 1, is a set
of sequences {yt , ct , lt , mct , wt , ∆t , Pt , P˜i t ,Rt }∞t=t0 satisfying the firms’ first order condition mct =
wt /at , (12) with P˜i t = P˜t , and P 1−ζt = αP 1−ζt−1 + (1−α)P˜ 1−ζt , the households’ first order conditions
uc (yt −Gt )wt = vl (lt )µt , uc (yt −Gt )/Pt = βRt Et uc (yt+1−Gt+1)/Pt+1, the aggregate resource con-
straint yt = at lt /∆t , where ∆t = (1−α)(P˜t /Pt )−ζ +α(Pt /Pt−1)ζ∆t−1, clearing of the goods market
ct +Gt = yt and the transversality condition, for {ut }∞t=t0 .
In the next step, we seek to estimate the model employing Bayesian methods. To do so we log-
linearize the structural equations around the deterministic steady state under zero inflation. Thus,
the dynamics in the benchmark economy are described by the following two structural equations:
σ(Et ŷt+1−Et ŷnt+1)=σ(ŷt − ŷnt )+ R̂t −Et p̂it+1− R̂nt (16)
p̂it =βEt p̂it+1+κ(ŷt − ŷnt ), (17)
where σ=−ucc c/(uc sc), ω= vl l l /vl and κ= (1−α)(1−αβ)(ω+σ)/α. Further k̂t denotes the per-
centage deviation of a generic variable kt from its steady state value k. The natural rates of output
and interest, i.e the values for output and real interest under flexible prices, are given by the follow-
ing expressions
ŷnt =
(1+ω)ât +σg t − µ̂t
ω+σ , (18)
g t = (Gt −G)/y and
R̂nt =σ[(g t − ŷnt )−Et (g t+1− ŷnt+1)]. (19)
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The model is closed by a simple interest rate feedback rule
R̂t = ρR R̂t−1+φpip̂it +φy ŷt . (20)
The general system (1) in the benchmark model then is the fundamental locally stable and unique
solution that satisfies (16)-(20) for a certain vector of constant policy coefficients φ= (ρR ,φpi,φy ).
Our welfare measure is the unconditional expectation of representative households’ utility.
Building on Woodford (2003), after averaging over all households the purely quadratic approxi-
mation to (9) in our benchmark model can be computed as8:
1
1−β [u−
uc yζ(ω+σ)
2κ
{var (p̂it )+λd var (ŷt − ŷet )}], (21)
where λd = κ/ζ and the efficient rate of output is given by
ŷet = ŷnt + µ̂t /(ω+σ). (22)
Note that from the perspective of the central bank the vector of structural parameters may be ran-
dom. Therefore the objective of the central bank (for a given realization θi ) reads:9
L(θi , x̂)= uc yζ(ω+σ)
2κ
{var (pit )+λd var (ŷt − ŷet )}. (23)
In the next subsection we consider habit formation and indexation to past inflation as exam-
ples of missing lags in the nuclear variables output and inflation.
8Throughout we assume that the steady state is rendered efficient by an appropriate setting of the sales
tax rate
9Note that the argument x̂ does not depend on time since we compute unconditional variances, i.e.
var (x̂t )= var (x̂), ∀t .
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2.2 Missing lags in endogenous variables
One example for a missing lag in an endogenous variable is to allow for an internal habit (e.g. Boivin
and Giannoni, 2006; Woodford, 2003) in households’ total consumption. In that case, the marginal
utility of consumption λt is no longer exclusively a function of current consumption. Instead, the
amount consumed last period affects households’ behavior:
λt = uc (ct −ηct−1)−βηEt uc (ct+1−ηct ), 0≤ η≤ 1, (24)
with η as the habit parameter. Correspondingly, the constituting equations for (1) are the policy
rule (20) and the modified versions of the Euler equation and the New Keynesian Philips curve:
ϕ[dt −ηdt−1]−ϕβηEt [dt+1−ηdt ] = Et p̂it+1+ R̂nt − R̂t ...
+ Etϕ[dt+1−ηdt ]−ϕβηEt [dt+2−ηdt+1] (25)
p̂it = κh[(dt −δ∗dt−1)−βδ∗Et (dt+1−δ∗dt )]+βEt p̂it+1 (26)
where dt = ŷt−ŷnt ,κh = ηϕκ[δ∗(ω+σ)]−1,ϕ=σ/(1−ηβ) and the natural rate of output follows10
[ω+ϕ(1+βη2)]ŷnt −ϕηŷnt−1−ϕηβEt ŷnt+1 = ϕ(1+βη2)g t −ϕηg t−1−ϕηβEt g t+1...
+ (1+ω)ât − µ̂t . (27)
Approximating households’ utility to second order results in the following expression for the
objective of the central bank:
L(θ2, x̂)=
(1−βη)ηϕuhc yhζ
2κhδ∗
{var (p̂it )+λd ,h var (ŷt − ŷet −δ∗(ŷt−1− ŷet−1))}, (28)
10The parameter δ∗, 0 ≤ δ∗ ≤ η, is the smaller root of this quadratic equation: ηϕ(1+βδ2) = [ω+ϕ(1+
βη2)]δ. This root is assigned to past values of the natural and efficient rate of output in their stationary
solutions.
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where λd ,h = κh/ζ and the efficient rate of output is characterized by
[ω+ϕ(1+βη2)]ŷet −ϕηŷet−1−ϕηβEt ŷet+1 = ϕ(1+βη2)g t −ϕηg t−1−ϕηβEt g t+1...
+ (1+ω)ât . (29)
Like habit formation, indexation of prices to past inflation induces the economy to evolve in a
history-dependent way. We assume that the fraction of prices that are not reconsidered α adjusts
according to the following simple rule:
logPi t = logPi t−1+γ logpit−1, (30)
with 0≤ γ≤ 1 as the degree of indexation. This implies that the dispersion measure is given by
∆t = (1−α)( P˜t
Pt
)−ζ+αpi−ζγt−1∆t−1piζt .
Correspondingly, the economy with indexation is characterized by a modified aggregate supply
curve
p̂it −γp̂it−1 =βEt (p̂it+1−γp̂it )+κ(ŷt − ŷnt ), (31)
(16) and (20). The corresponding loss function of the central bank reads (Woodford, 2003):
L(θ3, x̂)= uc yζ(ω+σ)
2κ
{var (p̂it −γp̂it−1)+λd var (ŷt − ŷet )}, (32)
where λd and the efficient rate of output are defined as in the benchmark economy.
2.3 Omitted variables
While the extensions discussed above modify preferences or technology, they do not add other
frictions to the economy. The primary aim – in principle – is to stabilize inflation. In order to allow
for the possibility of conflicting stabilization aims, we introduce a transaction friction by letting
17
real money balances entering households’ utility in a separable way. Notably, this change does not
affect the dynamics of inflation and output for a given monetary policy.11 More precisely, an euler
equation or demand equation for real money balances enters the set of equilibrium conditions:
zm(mt )
λt
= Rt −1
Rt
. (33)
We assume that z(mt ) implies satiation in real money balances at a finite positive level. The deriva-
tives zm , zmm have finite limiting values as m approaches the satiation level from below. In par-
ticular, the limiting value of zmm from below is negative (see Woodford, 2003a, Assumption 6.1).
Log-linearizing (33) results in:
m̂t =− 1
σm(R−1)
R̂t − 1
σm
λ̂t , (34)
where σm =−zmmm/zm . In this case the stabilization loss that results is given by:
L(θ4, x̂)= uc yζ(ω+σ)
2κ
{var (p̂it )+λd var (ŷt − ŷet )+λ1R var (R̂t )}, (35)
where λd = κ/ζ, λ1R = λdβ[v(ω+σ)(1−β)σm]−1 and v = y/m. The general form (1) has to satisfy
the interest rate rule, (16)-(17) and (34).
If we combine the features habit formation, indexation and a demand for cash, the utility of
the central bank’s objective is:
L(θ5, x̂)=
(1−βη)ηϕuhc yhζ
2κhδ∗
{var (p̂it−γp̂it−1)+λd ,h var (ŷt− ŷet −δ∗(ŷt−1− ŷet−1))+λ2R var (R̂t )}, (36)
with
λ2R =
λd ,hβδ
∗
vσm(1−β)(1−βη)ηϕ
11However, we assume that this does not lead to a optimal steady state that corresponds to Friedman’s
rule. I.e. the approximation point is still characterized by flexible prices and zero inflation (see Paustian and
Stoltenberg, 2006). Note that our specification of utility is consistent with recent findings by Andrés, López-
Salido and Vallés (2006) for the Euro area. They estimate the role of money for the business cycle of the Euro
area and the US and find that preferences are separable between consumption and real money balances.
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The equilibrium conditions are (25),(34) and
p̂it −γp̂it−1 =βEt (p̂it+1−γp̂it )+κh[(dt −δ∗dt−1)−βδ∗Et (dt+1−δ∗dt )] (37)
for a monetary policy (20).
2.4 Monetary policy and the lower bound on interest
The question of implementability is of particular interest in monetary policy: the zero bound on
interest rates, Rt ≥ 1, imposes a natural restriction on the set of feasible policies. We approximate
this constraint by analyzing implementable policies.
Definition 2 Consider the locally stable and unique fundamental solution for model i under a par-
ticular policy φ that satisfies (1) and the transversality condition. The policy φ is implementable
if the unconditional standard deviation of the net nominal interest rate σi under the fundamental
solution is at least k-times smaller than the steady state value for interest:
kσi ≤R−1, k > 0.
Notably, the higher k, the lower is the probability that the zero bound on interest rates becomes
in fact binding. We stress that this approach ignores certain feedback channels.12 Nevertheless,
computing the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate is one way to gauge the severity of
the lower bound constraint in linear models (see Woodfor, 2003 or more recently Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2005).
Throughout our optimal policy analysis we compute two vectors φ?: either requiring optimal
policy to be implementable or not. This procedure allows us to examine the welfare costs of the
zero bound requirement.
12Adam and Billi (2006) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explicitly account for the non-linear zero
bound constraint and show how the possibility of a binding constraint affects agents’ decisions.
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3 Results
3.1 Data and estimation results
We treat the variables real wage, output and consumer price inflation as observables. The data
consists of HP filtered13 quarterly values of these variables for the EU 13 countries from 1970-2006
14.
We do not estimate the parameters β= 0.99, the fraction c/y = 0.8 and ζ= 6. While we assume
the disturbances g t and ât to follow stationary AR(1) processes, µ̂t is supposed to be i .i .d .(see the
appendix for the assumed prior distribution of the estimated parameters).
We approximate the joint posterior distribution of structural parameters by drawing 100,000
times employing a MCMC algorithm. To insure convergence, we discard the first 20,000 draws. In
general, all parameters with the exception of the relative risk aversion with respect to real money
balances σm are identified (see Figure 1-5 and table 9 in the appendix). The fact that we are not
able to identify σm comes at no surprise since it only appears in equations that have no influence
on predicting output, inflation or the real wage.
In order to assess the relevance of each perturbation we compute marginal likelihoods and cor-
responding posterior odds as their weighted average.15 The results are presented in table 1. Note
that adding features to the model does not necessarily increase the marginal likelihood. This is
supported by the following observations: First, enriching the benchmark model with a demand
for cash lowers the marginal likelihood, since real money balances do not help to predict the ob-
servable variables. On the contrary the additional parameter to estimate (σm) blurs the precision
of the remaining parameters slightly (1677.9351< 1677.2605). Second, while habit formation does
modify the dynamics of the model it does not improve the fit of the model. This points to a well
known problem in Bayesian model estimation, namely that the informative prior on the habit pa-
rameter introduces curvature into the posterior density surface that tilts it away from being zero at
13We set λHP = 1600 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig, 2002.
14The data-set we use was kindly provided by the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (EABCNF). For a
description of how this data is constructed see Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2001.
15We employ equal prior weights for each model.
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the posterior, which would increase the predictive density. Third, history dependence in inflation
seems to improve the predictive power of the model. Model 3 has the highest marginal likelihood.
Thus, the largest model incorporates features that helps to predict the data (indexation) and others
that do not (habit and money). It therefore exhibits a higher marginal likelihood than the bench-
mark model but a lower than the best one. This emphasizes our case: especially when conducting
Bayesian model estimation one should consider carefully which features to include into the model
and which not.
Table 1: Posterior odds and marginal data densities
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
p(Y |Mi ) 1677.9351 1675.2409 1691.6444 1677.2605 1687.8380
pii 0.1995 0.1992 0.2011 0.1994 0.2007
3.2 Optimal policy at the posterior mean
As a benchmark we determine the optimal policy φ?i = (ρ?R ,φ?pi ,φ?y )i at the posterior mean Θ¯i for
each model i , i = 1,2, ..,5, i.e. we assume that the model and the corresponding parameters are
known. Throughout our analysis we consider two cases: either optimal policies are assumed to be
implementable or not. To be more precise, in the former case we require twice the unconditional
standard deviation of the nominal interest rate not to exceed the difference between steady state
interest and the zero bound (see definition 2 with k = 2). The optimal coefficients and the resulting
business cycles costs (BCC ) expressed as equivalent reductions in steady state consumption are
displayed in table 2.
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Table 2: Optimal Policy at the Posterior Mean (φ?i )
R̂t = ρR R̂t−1+φpip̂it +φy ŷt
No IC IC
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
ρR 1.02 1.06 1.08 1.26 1.37 1.23 1.20 1.70 1.23 1.37
φpi 3 3 3 2.22 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.32 0.19 0.12
φy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BCC (φ?i ) 0.39% 0.42% 0.45% 1.20 % 1.20% 2.38% 2.11% 1.25% 2.42% 1.20%
Evidently, optimal policies in both cases are characterized by drawing heavily on past interest
rates. To put it differently, optimal policy is history-dependent (Woodford, 2003). In the first three
models inflation stabilization is the predominant aim. Correspondingly, optimal policies feature a
strong reaction on inflation. In models 4 and 5 households value real money balances as a medium
for transactions. This introduces the stabilization of the nominal interest rate as an conflicting aim
to price stability (see (35) and (36)). Therefore, optimal policies in these models exhibit a higher
coefficient ρR to smooth interest rates and a less aggressive response to inflation.
Remarkably, requiring implementable policies leads to sizeable welfare losses in models 1-3
(compare table 2 and 3), where households’ utility does not depend on variations in interest rates.
In such an environment the implementability constraint implicitly introduces this by restricting
the set of feasible policies. In particular, policies that aggressively fight inflation drop out since
these policies result in a high variability of interest.16 To get intuition on this suppose that φy is
small and that the economy in model 1 is hit by a cost push shock. To fight inflationary tendencies
the output gap must decrease according to the aggregate supply curve (17). This in turn requires
a strong increase of the nominal interest rate to fulfill the euler equation (16) since the cost push
shock affects the natural rate of interest.
Comparing the results for the two models that feature a demand for cash reveals that the imple-
16Note that even if ρpi < 1 equilibrium sequences are uniquely determined and converge to the steady
state. The condition for local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences reads: ρpi+ (1−β)/κφy >
1−ρR (Woodford, 2003).
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mentability constraint affects the results in different ways. While the implementability constraint
is a restriction on optimal policies in model 4 it is not in 5. Although both specifications incor-
porate stabilizing the nominal interest as a policy aim, it is dominated by inflation stabilization in
model 4 (see table 3).
Table 3: The weights λd and λr at the posterior mean
Weights Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
λd 0.00690 0.03081 0.01048 0.00701 0.04728
λR - - - 0.06811 0.60396
We conclude that requiring policies to be implementable comes at a cost which can be substan-
tial if inflation stabilization is the predominant aim according to preferences. However, ignoring
the issue of the zero bound may cause credibility problems since agents form their expectations
rationally.
3.3 Optimal policy under parameter uncertainty
In this section we consider the situation of a central bank that knows the true model but is uncer-
tain about the corresponding parameters, i.e. we are solving the optimal policy problem under pa-
rameter uncertainty (see (5)). The optimal policy resulting of this procedure,φ?i pu = (ρ?R ,φ?pi ,φ?y )i pu ,
maximizes representative households’ utility over the posterior distribution of Θi , i = 1,2...5. The
main findings are: optimal policy under parameter uncertainty does not differ substantially if pol-
icy is not subject to the implementabiltiy constraint. But if the central bank is constrained in that
way, following the optimal policy at the posterior mean is not a good policy recommendation: the
central bank risks to violate the implementability requirement with high probability over the pa-
rameter space with one exception: the optimal policy of model 5 at the posterior mean, φ?5 , is
unaffected by parameter uncertainty.
In table 4 we present our findings for optimal policy under parameter uncertainty. If we do
not impose the implentability constraint (No IC ), the optimal rule in each model is very similar to
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the optimal rule at the posterior mean. Business cycle cost computed over all draws are therefore
alike.17
Table 4: Optimal Policy under Parameter Uncertainty (φ?i pu)
R̂t = ρR R̂t−1+φpip̂it +φy ŷt
No IC IC
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
ρR 1.02 1.07 1.10 1.24 1.33 1.20 1.17 1.66 1.22 1.33
φpi 3 3 3 2.36 0.13 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.13
φy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BCC (φ?i )−BCC (φ?i pu) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - - -
ICV (φ?i ) - - - - - 40% 46% 43% 40% 0%
However, if we require optimal policy to be implementable (IC ) the picture changes. In models
where optimal policy is characterized by a binding implentability constraint at the posterior mean
(model 1,2,3 and 6), variations over the parameter vector lead easily to a violation of this constraint
(in 40% to 46% of all draws). As one would expect, the optimal policy rules φ?i pu in each model
are characterized by a lower coefficient on inflation and a slightly higher one on past interest rate.
This corresponds to the classical result of Brainard (1967): If policy makers are uncertain about
the true parameters, then they act more cautious than if the parameters were certain. To sum up,
uncertainty about the true parameters of a model plays an important role if the zero bound on
interest is taken into account.
Our analysis so far indicates that parameter uncertainty does not affect optimal policy in the
large model. This suggests that, despite the fact that model 5 does not have the highest marginal
likelihood (see table 1), it can insulate the policy maker against the source of parameter uncer-
tainty. We will put this statement on stand in the next section, where specification uncertainty is
analyzed.
17LOWW (2005) find that parameter uncertainty plays a minor role as a source of uncertainty in a similar
economic environment, too.
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3.4 Optimal policy under specification uncertainty
Is there a need for a robust rule with respect to specification uncertainty? To put it differently,
what would happen if we optimize in one model but the true model is a different one? To answer
this question we compare social welfare of optimal rules across models. In table 5 we display how
much steady state consumption agents in a particular model are willing to give up permanently to
be indifferent between the optimal rule in that model and optimal rules of other models. These
additional welfare costs are due to specification uncertainty.
Opposed to findings under parameter uncertainty the large model (M5) cannot be recom-
mended as a policy device. Incorporating all model features does not in general guard against
specification uncertainty. In other words, following a strategy similar to minmax to avoid possible
high losses in M5 is not optimal. Furthermore, the welfare costs of not knowing the true model are
at least 1% (see column 6) for all models under consideration. Taking into account that business
cycle cost at the posterior mean are less than 1%, this can be referred to as substantial.
Table 5: Optimal Policy under Specification Uncertainty (φ?su): NO IC
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 WM
BCC (φ?1 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 7.70% 1.58%
BCC (φ?2 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.00% 0 0.00% 0.013% 7.48% 1.53%
BCC (φ?3 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.11% 7.39% 1.51%
BCC (φ?4 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.20% 0.21% 0.09% 0 4.72% 1.05%
BCC (φ?5 )−BCC (φ?i ) 2.52% 2.45% 0.98 1.73% 0 1.53%
BCC (φ?su)−BCC (φ?i ) 0.92% 0.87% 0.51 % 0.33% 1.10% 0.75%
W M indicates the weighted relative business cycle costs over the modelspace. For model j , j = 1,2, ..,5, this
is defined as
∑5
i=1[BCC (φ
?
j )−BCC (φ?i )]p(Y |Mi ).
These outcomes indicate possible welfare gains for the optimal policy rule according to (6) by
determining the policy rule φ?su = (ρ?R ,φ?pi ,φ?y ) that minimizes the loss across models, each eval-
uated at its posterior mean. Indeed, the optimal policy under specification uncertainty cuts the
additional welfare cost significantly (see the last column of table 5). The optimal rule (table 9,
column 1 in the appendix) mirrors a compromise between the optimal policies in each model. It
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reacts weaker on inflation than in model 1-4, where inflation stabilization is the primary aim to
avoid high welfare losses in model 5. However, the higher coefficient on inflation compared to
model 5 leads to a decrease of welfare losses across the majority of models (see line 5 of table 5).
Table 6: Optimal Policy under Specification Uncertainty (φ?su): IC
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
BCC (φ?1 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0 0.20% ICV * ICV 0.07%
BCC (φ?2 )−BCC (φ?i ) ICV 0 ICV ICV ICV
BCC (φ?3 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.51% 0.91% 0 0.49% 0.10%
BCC (φ?4 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.00% 0.20% ICV 0 0.07%
BCC (φ?5 )−BCC (φ?i ) 0.54% 0.75% 0.17% 0.51% 0
BCC (φ?su)−BCC (φ?i ) 0.04% 0.18% 0.15% 0.03% 0.07%
IV C in (i , j ) indicates that policy j violates the implementability constraint in model i .
Requiring policy to be implementable, the optimal policy rule derived from the large model is
the only one that does not violate this constraint over the model space. This result is similar to the
section above and comes at no surprise since the rule is characterized by a muted reaction and a
high degree of interest rate inertia. However, the optimal policy rule abstains from violations of the
zero bound and reduces additional welfare losses compared to the optimal rule from the largest
model by approximately 0.5% (see line 5 of table 6), too. The optimal rule under specification
uncertainty is similar to the unconstrained one, but the reaction on inflation is weaker in order
to achieve the low variations of interest required by the implementability constraint (see second
column 2 of table 9 in the appendix).
While the optimal policy device under parameter uncertainty is just to determine optimal pol-
icy in the largest model, this strategy leads to substantial welfare losses under specification uncer-
tainty. Simply following policy advise from the largest model can therefore not be recommended.
Which policy the central bank should follow in the presence of both sources of uncertainty will be
investigated in the next section.
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3.5 Optimal policy under parameter and specification uncertainty
In this section the central bank faces uncertainty about the true model as well as the true vector
of deep parameters. The optimal policy rule φ?psu = (ρ?R ,φ?pi ,φ?y ) is therefore determined by solving
problem (7) 18.
In table 11 in the appendix and in table 7 we display the characteristics of the optimal policy
in the presence of both sources of uncertainty. They reflect findings which were already men-
tioned earlier in the paper: First, faced with an increase in uncertainty, optimal policy reacts more
cautious. Independent of whether policy is required to be implementable or not, optimal policy
rules are characterized by lower reaction coefficients (see the optimal policy coefficients in table
11). Second, optimal policy determined only at the posterior mean leads to a high percentage of
violations of the implementability constraint if the distribution of deep parameters is taken into
account (table 7 row 5). To avoid violations of the IC constraint, the optimal rule features a very
low coefficient on inflation (0.09) (see column 2 of table 11).
In table 7 we assess the welfare costs of each source of model uncertainty separately. If the
policy maker is confronted with specification and parameter uncertainty, the optimal policy rule
leads to weighted average welfare costs of 1.58% in terms of an equivalent reduction in steady state
consumption. The difference between rows 2 and 3 is the reduction of welfare costs due to using
the knowledge about the distribution of deep parameters. It is worth 0.01%. Notably, this gain
is only due to a reduction of welfare costs in model 5, the model where the highest losses occur.
In row 1 we display the welfare costs that arise under optimal policy in each model if the policy
makers faces parameter uncertainty. Correspondingly, a comparison of rows 1 and 2 reveals the
substantial costs of specification uncertainty. Knowing the true structure (the true model) of the
economy would cut welfare costs in half on average. This difference in welfare costs that occur in
any case can be interpreted as costs for insurance against different sources of model uncertainty.
Since as we have demonstrated, welfare costs due to an deficient policy can be much higher, the
18For our large set of models, each associated with 80000 draws, solving problem (7)is a cumbersome task.
We therefore considered only the last 20000 draws from each model. Since we insured convergence of our
Markov chain earlier, restricting the number of draws, has no impact on the validity of the results in this
section.
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policy maker might however be willing to bear those costs.
Table 7: Comparison of Optimal Policy under Parameter and Specification Uncertainty
No IC IC
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 WM M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
BCC (φ?pu) 0.36% 0.41% 0.46% 1.15% 1.31% 0.74% 2.72% 2.38% 1.37% 2.71% 1.31%
BCC (φ?su) 1.24% 1.35% 0.96 % 1.48% 2.92% 1.59% - - - - -
BCC (φ?psu) 1.25% 1.36% 0.98 % 1.49% 2.82% 1.58% 2.74% 2.69% 1.6% 2.73% 1.36%
ICV (φ?su) - - - - - - 39% 1% 43% 28% 26%
ICV (φ?psu) - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a novel methodology to analyze optimal policies under model uncertainty
in micro-founded macroeconomic models. To be more specific, it allows to capture specification
uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and a combination of both in a unified framework. We suggest
to start with a benchmark model where the basic intuition is well known and include step by step
reasonable model extensions. This bottom-up approach allows us to evaluate quantitatively the
explanatory power gain as well as the effect of each of these components on the optimal policy
decision separately.
We apply our methodology to assess and quantify the relevant sources of uncertainty for the
optimal conduct of monetary policy within (parameter uncertainty) and across models (specifi-
cation uncertainty) using EU 13 data. Parameter uncertainty matters only if the zero bound on
interest rates is explicitly taken into account. Then, optimal policy determined at the posterior
mean violates the implementability constraint in about 40% of draws from the distributions of the
parameters.
In either case, optimal monetary policy is highly sensitive with respect to specification un-
certainty. Knowledge about the true structure of the economy would cut welfare costs in half.
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However, incorporating this uncertainty into the decision about optimal policy avoids high wel-
fare losses and renders policy implementable.
We recommend to follow an optimal policy that is aware of both sources of uncertainty. It
evades high losses and violations of the zero bound constraint over the parameter and model dis-
tribution, jointly. Nevertheless, since insuring against model uncertainty comes at a cost, our re-
sults point towards the importance of improving the theoretical understanding of the fundamental
mechanisms of the economies under consideration.
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5 Appendix
Estimation Results
Table 8: Prior distribution of the structural parameters
Pr i or di str i buti on
Parameter distribution mean std
ρ beta 0.8 0.1
φpi normal 1.7 0.1
φy normal 0.125 0.05
ω normal 2 0.5
σc normal 1.5 0.375
α beta 0.75 0.05
η beta 0.7 0.1
γ beta 0.75 0.15
σm normal 1.25 0.375
ψg beta 0.5 0.3
ψa beta 0.5 0.1
σg invgamma 0.05 0.026
σa invgamma 0.05 0.026
σµ invgamma 0.05 0.026
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Additional tables and figures
Figure 1: Prior vs. posterior in model 1
0 0.5 1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
rho     
1 2 3
0
1000
2000
3000
phi pi  
0 0.5 1
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
phi y   
0 2 4
0
1000
2000
3000
omega   
0 1 2 3
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
sigma c 
0 0.5 1
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
alpha   
0 0.5 1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
psi g   
0 0.5 1
0
1000
2000
3000
psi a   
0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
x 104 sigma g 
0 0.2 0.4
0
1
2
3
4
x 104 sigma a 
0 0.2 0.4
0
2
4
6
x 104 sigma mu
34
Figure 2: Prior vs. posterior in model 2
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Figure 3: Prior vs. posterior in model 3
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Figure 4: Prior vs. posterior in model 4
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Figure 5: Prior vs. posterior in model 5
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Table 10: The optimal robust policy rule at the posterior mean across models
Coefficients No IC IC
ρR 1.2077 1.2297
φpi 0.6706 0.1797
φy 0.0013 0.0006
38
Table 11: The optimal robust policy rule over all draws across models
Coefficients No IC IC
ρR 1.18 1.19
φpi 0.63 0.09
φy 0.00 0.00
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